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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, displeased buyers and sellers of real property
have sued real estate agents' with increasing frequency.2 Buyers'
actions have often involved claims of misrepresentation concerning
the condition of the property.' Sellers' actions, on the other hand,
have often involved claims of breach of fiduciary duty, such as
breach of loyalty due to conflict of interest.4 Many of these same
situations have also produced actions by real estate agents against
customers for unpaid commissions. 5 This background of growing
* Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Kansas; B.A., 1972; M.B.A., 1974,
University of Wisconsin; J.D., 1977, University of Kansas.
This research was supported by the University of Kansas School of Business Research
Fund provided by the Fourth National Bank and Trust Company, Wichita. The ideas and
opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. The term "real estate agent" as used in this article is meant to include all real estate
licensees who may represent a party in a real estate transaction. Brokers and salespersons
are thus treated alike. Of course, with respect to a specific liability producing situation, a
broker may be liable for the misconduct of a salesperson who is working on behalf of the
broker.
2. See Campbell, Real Estate Industry Faces Lawsuit Crisis, L.A. Times, Sept. 7, 1980,
at pt. viii, at 1.
3. E.g., Barnes v. Lopez, 25 Ariz. App. 477, 544 P.2d 694 (1976) (zoning status of prop-
erty); Saporta v. Barbagelata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 463, 33 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1963) (termite dam-
age); Neff v. Bud Lewis Co., 89 N.M. 145, 548 P.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1976) (quality of
improvements).
4. E.g., Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 441 P.2d 101, 68 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1968); First
Trust Co. v. McKenna, 614 P.2d 1027 (Mont. 1980); Frisell v. Newmann, 71 Wash. 2d 520,
429 P.2d 864 (1967).
5. E.g., Kimmell v. Clark, 21 Ariz. App. 455, 520 P.2d 851 (1974); Jensen v. Peterson,
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
litigation has set the stage for actions against real estate agents for
problems related to the complexities of unconventional real estate
transactions that have become so prevalent in the last several years
due to higher interest rates.' The real estate agent is an especially
likely defendant because the agent will often be the only solvent
party available as a target for blame when troubles arise in these
transactions.
Real estate transactions are structured in a variety of ways to
facilitate financing. The record high interest rates for conventional
mortgage loans of the last few years have led to a number of inno-
vative alternative forms of financing. As a result, otherwise impos-
sible transactions have frequently proceeded through the use of
shared appreciation mortgages, wraparound mortgages, balloon
notes, installment contracts for deed, leases with purchase options,
and similar techniques. Undoubtedly, with conventional mortgage
interest rates as high as seventeen percent, the residential real es-
tate market would have completely collapsed without these unor-
thodox transactions. Although newly structured, "lower" interest
institutional offerings such as the variable or adjustable rate mort-
gage partly sustained the residential market, the involvement of
sellers and other nontraditional parties as financiers was a far more
significant factor during the worst of times.7
Although interest rates have declined slowly from these his-
toric highs, real estate sales frequently continue to involve some
form of unconventional financing. In the last few years, creative
financing techniques have been a frequent subject of discussion in
the mass media, and they are now viewed with a degree of accept-
ance. These techniques are often sophisticated, however, and it
would be advisable for the average person to have the close assis-
tance of a competent advisor before becoming a party to such a
transaction.
264 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1978); Thompson v. Hoagland, 100 N.J. Super. 478, 242 A.2d 642
(App. Div. 1968).
6. For a discussion of the problems associated with creatively financed transactions, see
Zumpano and Marsh, Creative Financing Arrangements: Risks and Liabilities, 12 REAL
EST. L.J. 151, 154-60 (1983). See also Andrew, "Creative Financing" Ends in Foreclosure for
More Home Buyers, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
7. Census Bureau data shows that second mortgages, including creative financing, rose
from $3.1 billion in 1971 to $31.6 billion in 1981. Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1984, at 29, col. 1. The
National Association of Realtors estimated that 60% of existing home loan sales involved
creative financing in the latter part of 1981. Andrew, supra note 6, at 1, col. 6. A survey of
realtors in the southeast revealed that 41% of the home sales involved some form of seller
financing. Koch, Steinhauser & Ihlanfeldt, The Risks of Creative Financing, EcoN. REV.
Dec. 1982, at 4 (published by Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
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Real estate agents have become actively involved in structur-
ing these creatively financed transactions. In fact, real estate
agents have boldly represented in advertisements that, in spite of
inflated property prices and high interest rates, they can make
home buying affordable again through their expert assistance. The
process of facilitating sales thus has become increasingly complex;
the real estate agent's function has expanded far beyond the role
of an intermediary who brings buyers and sellers together. The as-
sumption of widening responsibilities, however, brings with it the
threat of increased exposure to liability. This article will consider
the potential liability of the real estate agent who is actively en-
gaged in structuring unconventional transactions to facilitate prop-
erty sales.
II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY
There are several legal theories that may serve as a basis for
real estate agent liability in transactions involving creative financ-
ing. As is often the case with emerging areas of responsibility,
plaintiffs are likely to assert multiple legal theories.'
A. Contract
A real estate agent's liability may be based on breach of con-
tract. The real estate agent and client become parties to a contract
when they agree that the client shall list the property for sale with
the agent. Under the listing contract, the agent undertakes certain
express and implied obligations. A breach of any such contractual
obligation may serve to establish the liability of the agent. The
listing contract will typically consist of a simple form that a trade
association or the real estate agent's firm supplies, and it is there-
fore not usually viewed as creating unusual obligations for the
agent. In fact, the listing contract often will be a totally one-sided
expression of the principal's obligations.' If it expressly states the
agent's obligations, it will likely be a very limited statement.' 0 Be-
8. See, e.g., Coats v. Uhlmann, 87 Mich. App. 385, 274 N.W.2d 792 (1978) (negligent
misrepresentation of deed exception sounds in both contract and tort); American Mortgage
Inv. Co. v. Hardin-Stockton Corp., 671 S.W.2d 283 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (breach of fiduciary
relationship between real estate broker and seller "will give rise to a cause of action in either
contract or tort").
9. See, e.g., G. SIEDEL, REAL ESTATE LAW 518, app. B (Forms: Listing Agreement 1979).
10. See, e.g., D.B. BURKE, LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS § 2.6 Model Listing Agree-
ment, at 50 (1982) (going beyond most listing agreements in this regard). In a three and
one-half page "plain English" listing agreement only about one-third of one page is devoted
19851
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cause implied terms in a contract often flow from the express
terms, the agent's obligations may multiply if a listing reflects a
more complex transaction. Thus, if the listing contract describes
an unconventional transaction, the real estate agent may have as-
sumed additional responsibilities necessary to facilitate the trans-
action. For example, if the listing contract contemplates seller fi-
nancing with a purchase money mortgage, the agent has arguably
assumed the responsibility of seeing that an appropriate mortgage
instrument is properly prepared and duly recorded. If something
were to go wrong, such as the mortgage not being recorded, a
strong case could be made that the agent should be liable for the
loss that the nonfulfillment of the implied obligation caused. 1 Ob-
viously, there will be considerable debate among litigants over the
existence, nature, and breadth of such implied obligations.
B. Agency
The real estate agent is an agent for a principal, which in most
cases is the seller and occasionally the buyer. Therefore, liability
may be based on a breach of any of the number of duties that
agents owe to their principals according to general principles of
to the agent's obligations in a paragraph entitled "Broker Warranties":
You, as the broker, will use your best efforts to sell the property and warrant
that upon sale you are the sole broker involved, at least so far as you know, in
the transaction, and entitled to a commission. You will indemnify me for any
and all commissions sought by other brokers in connection with this transaction
and defend me in case of litigation over such alleged commissions. Further, you
warrant that every prospect presented to me is credit worthy and financially
able to purchase the property and to indemnify me for any misrepresentations
made by you, not based upon information given by me, about the property, pro-
vided that this warranty applies only within and up to the limits of any commis-
sion due you for negotiation of this transaction.
Id. at 52.
11. The real estate agent would, of course, be free to enlist the assistance of a lawyer in
fulfilling such an obligation. The real estate agent also would be entitled to reimbursement
of expenses from his principal. If a lawyer is retained to oversee the transaction, ultimate
responsibility for the recording error rests with the lawyer. If the agent handles the transac-
tion without the assistance of a lawyer, then the agent bears the final responsibility for the
resulting loss. Cf. Morley v. J. Pagel Realty & Ins., 27 Ariz. App. 62, 550 P.2d 1104 (1976)
(real estate agent found liable for failing to inform sellers that purchasers' offer contem-
plated no security and that a mortgage should be required); Townsend v. Doss, 2 Ark. App.
195, 618 S.W.2d 173 (1981) (real estate agent found liable to seller for purchaser's failure to
pay downpayment because agent informed seller that he would be in charge of the entire
transaction and that if downpayment was not payed seller could get her house back). For a
discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 52-64. For further discussion
regarding the roles of real estate agent and lawyer, see infra text accompanying notes 39-49
and 130-33. See also Currier, Finding the Broker's Place in the Typical Residential Real
Estate Transaction, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 655 (1982).
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agency law.'" Because of the considerable breadth of these obliga-
tions and the high standards associated with the fiduciary concept,
agency theory will probably serve as a frequent basis for real estate
agent liability.
Under traditional agency theory, real estate agents involved in
creatively financed transactions may be bound to somewhat atypi-
cal obligations. Several courts have referred to section 378 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency in identifying a variety of duties
that real estate agents owe to their principals."3 This section
provides:
One who, by a gratuitous promise or other conduct which he
should realize will cause another reasonably to rely upon the
performance of definite acts of service by him as the other's
agent, causes the other to refrain from having such acts done by
other available means is subject to a duty to use care to perform
such service or, while other means are available, to give notice
that he will not perform."
The Restatement's rule is essentially a rule of estoppel. When
a real estate agent leads a party into an unconventional transac-
tion, the rule of section 378 may serve to establish duties beyond
those routinely associated with real estate agents. Unless the agent
advises that specified services such as providing counsel, preparing
documents, and supervising the closing process, will not be pro-
vided, the agent has arguably assumed such obligations. Addition-
ally, if the agent undertakes a function such as document prepara-
tion, it must be done competently and in the best interest of the
principal.15
Agency law imposes upon the agent the fiduciary duty to act
12. The duties that an agent owes a principal include good faith and loyalty to further
the principal's interests, adherence to the principal's instructions, exercise of ordinary and
reasonable skill in the performance of the agency, and the duty not to act in such a way as
to bring disrepute upon the principal. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 387-98
(1958).
13. E.g., Townsend v. Doss, 2 Ark. App. 195, 618 S.W.2d 173 (1981) (real estate agent
found liable to seller for purchaser's failure to pay downpayment because agent informed
seller that he would be in charge of the entire transaction and that if the downpayment was
not paid seller could get her house back). For a discussion of Townsend, see infra text ac-
companying notes 60-64. See also Lester v. Marshall, 143 Colo. 189, 352 P.2d 786 (1960)
(agent's agreement to perform the service of removing an encumbrance is evidenced by fact
that agent did not recommend that counsel be employed); Mayflower Mortgage Co. v.
Brown, 530 P.2d 1298 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975) (agent's gratuitous undertaking to search the
title is a basis for liability when search not performed and title not as represented).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 378 (1958).
15. For a discussion of competence see infra text accompanying notes 22-30.
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toward the principal with the utmost good faith and loyalty." As
such, the real estate agent faces what in some circumstances can be
a perplexing burden of placing the interest of the principal above
that of the agent. The great wealth of legal authority in this area
addresses matters such as self dealing17  or undisclosed dual
agency.18 Undoubtedly, a general sense of ethics and morality has
assisted most real estate agents in avoiding problems of this kind.
The agent's role in the unconventional real estate transaction,
however, presents a problem of a different character: the agent is
involved in producing an "able" buyer. The agent reforms the
transaction in such a way as to make that which was unaffordable
in conventional terms affordable for the prospective buyer. The
transaction requires extra efforts from the agent, and presents new
and unusual risks for the principal. The agent's desire to earn a
commission conflicts with the duty to protect and inform the prin-
cipal. Agents therefore may be inclined to draw inadequate atten-
tion to the additional risks associated with the unconventional
transaction.
A similar conflict of interest is inherent in all real estate trans-
actions where the agent is paid on a commission basis. For exam-
ple, in the ordinary real estate transaction, the agent's eagerness to
earn a commission may cause him to influence the principal into
accepting a low purchase offer. Although such activity should not
be condoned, the subconscious forces at play render it an almost
unavoidable fact of life. In this situation, however, the principal is
16. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Tackett, 163 Ind. App. 211, 323 N.E.2d 242 (1975);
Johnson v. Freytag, 338 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); see Kline v. Orebaugh, 214 Kan.
207, 519 P.2d 691 (1974).
The fiduciary duty is potentially broader than a real estate agent's duty as expressed in
a state licensing statute. The court in Carnell v. Watson, 176 Mont. 344, 578 P.2d 308
(1978), stated:
While the Real Estate License Act contains salutory provisions with regard to
the conduct of brokers and agents, they are not exhaustive. The duty of a real
estate broker or agent to deal fairly with his client ultimately arises from a sepa-
rate fiduciary relationship between them, and not because of the existence of a
licensing act. While a breach of a duty may also be a violation of the licensing
act, it may also constitute an independent reason to deny a commission to the
broker or agent-perhaps the most effective deterrent of all.
Id. at 350, 578 P.2d at 312.
17. E.g., George v. Bolen, 2 Kan. App. 385, 580 P.2d 1357 (1978); Martin v. Vincent,
181 Mont. 247, 593 P.2d 45 (1979); Anderson v. Griffith, 501 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973).
18. E.g., Ellis v. Flink, 374 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1979) (Boyd, J., dissenting from denial of writ
of certiorari); Barbat v. M.E. Arden Co., 74 Mich. App. 540, 254 N.W.2d 779 (1977); PMH
Properties v. Nichols, 263 N.W.2d 799 (Minn. 1978).
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left to fend for himself with respect to one fairly straightforward
and comprehensible factor-price. This determination always will
be a matter of personal economics. As long as the agent has not
actively persuaded the principal to accept a below market price,
the phenomenon would not seem to be so out of character as to be
legally neglectful or abusive.19
The unconventional transaction, however, is of a markedly dif-
ferent nature. Because of the unusual attributes and complexity of
such a transaction, the principal needs and deserves a great deal
more assistance. The typical principal will not have sufficient in-
formation to independently evaluate the risks and benefits of the
proposed transaction. As a fiduciary, the real estate agent should
explain and make full and complete disclosure of all material as-
pects of the transaction.2 0 This disclosure should include a careful
and thorough explanation of all the additional risks associated
with the unconventional attributes of the transaction. However,
the real estate agent, who has expended extra effort to make the
property affordable for the prospective buyer, will not be eager to
jeopardize the deal and the commission by alerting the principal to
potential problems. 2
1
19. Cf. Haymes v. Rogers, 70 Ariz. 257, 219 P.2d 339 (real estate agent under listing
contract' for $9,500 breached fiduciary duty by telling prospective purchaser that seller
would probably accept $8,500), rev'd and remanded on rehearing, 70 Ariz. 408, 222 P.2d 789
(1950) (issue of real estate agent's bad faith should have been submitted to the jury).
20. E.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. Lerner, 87 IMI. App. 3d 801, 410 N.E.2d 225 (1980);
Miles v. Perpetual Say. & Loan Co., 58 Ohio St. 2d 93, 388 N.E.2d 1364 (1979); see Russell
v. Truitt, 554 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
21. The recent case of Zee v. Assam, 336 N.W.2d 162 (S.D. 1983), serves as an obvious
example of an agent who neglected to adequately advise and counsel a party about the
potential risks of a transaction because he was eager to close the deal. When the seller
rejected the buyers' offer by refusing to pay one-half of the title insurance costs, the real
estate agent advised the buyers "not to let the 'title insurance thing blow the deal because it
was a good deal.'" Id. at 163. Buyers followed the agent's advice that "'title insurance
would be a waste of money'" and that buyers should "'just forget about title insurance.' "
Id. The buyers eventually discovered an undisclosed encumbrance on the property and
brought an action against the then-bankrupt seller and the real estate agent. The South
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against the real estate agent on the grounds
of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty for the $15,000 that the buyers had to pay to
clear the title. See also Timmsen v. Forest E. Olson, Inc., 6 Cal. App. 3d 860, 86 Cal. Rptr.
359 (1970). In Timmsen the court found that the trial court incorrectly awarded defendant's
motion for nonsuit after plaintiff's opening statement. The opening statement alleged that
the real estate agent who presented an unsound offer to an unsophisticated principal vio-
lated his fiduciary duty to determine the soundness of the offer and inform the principal,
and that the agent hastened the sale at terms unfavorable to his client simply to receive the
commission quickly or to prevent the listing contract from expiring. After reviewing these
allegations, the appellate court held that the issue of the agent's liability should have been
presented to a jury.
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Under agency law the agent also owes the principal a duty to
exercise reasonable skill and care.22 In this regard, it has been said
that there is a duty to disclose knowledge and material facts con-
cerning the transaction.2 3 A difficult question is presented with re-
spect to the degree of skill, care, and knowledge for which the real
estate agent will be held accountable. For example, on the one
hand, real estate agents are frequently admonished not to give le-
gal advice.24 On the other hand, there is a growing tendency to
characterize the real estate agent as "a highly skilled professional
with a great breadth of knowledge of real estate law."'2 5
The applicable duty of care or skill of the real estate agent
cannot be identified with certainty because there have been few
cases addressing this issue, and because the holdings in these cases
have been narrowly anchored in the facts of each situation. For the
most part, courts have resorted to traditional agency principles
with little amplification.
Section 379 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency is a good
point of reference for a discussion of the duty of care to which
agents usually are held. It reads:
Unless otherwise agreed, a paid agent is subject to a duty to the
principal to act with standard care and with the skill which is
standard in the locality for the kind of work which he is em-
ployed to perform and, in addition, to exercise any special skill
that he has.26
Although the application of this rule often involves comparisons
between parties of the same business or occupation," broader com-
22. E.g., Collegiate Mfg. Co. v. McDowell's Agency, Inc., 200 N.W.2d 854 (Iowa 1972);
Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Lufkin-Beaumont Motor Coaches, 215 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1948); National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wyoming County Ins. Agency, 156 W. Va. 521,
195 S.E.2d 151 (1973).
23. E.g., Veach v. Meyers Real Estate, Inc., 599 P.2d 746 (Alaska 1979) (failure to ac-
cept an offer and to indicate that such offer included acceptance of easement); Neff v. Budd
Lewis Co., 89 N.M. 145, 548 P.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1976) (building defect); Murph & Fritz's
Place, Inc. v. Loretta, 112 Misc. 2d 554, 447 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1982) (nonreceipt of deposit);
State v. Wells, 630 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. App. 1982) (false representation to client that her
equity in a house had no value); Moore v. Turner, 137 W. Va. 299, 71 S.E.2d 342 (1952)
(comparable sales prices).
24. See, e.g., C. JAcoaus & D. LEVi, REAL ESTATE LAW 106 (1980).
25. R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAW 91 (8th ed. 1983)..
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379(1) (1958).
27. See, e.g., Smith v. Fidelity & Colombia Trust Co., 227 Ky. 120, 12 S.W.2d 276
(1928) (duty to employ that degree of skill usually possesed and exercised by others in the
same business).
[Vol. 39:429
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parisons may be justified.2 8 As worded, this rule does not focus on
the occupation or profession of the agent. Instead, the focus is on
the kind of work to be performed. Thus a comparison of the real
estate agent's performance to that of a lawyer, accountant, banker,
title insurer, financial advisor, or other similar practitioners, may
be appropriate depending on the specific services provided and the
totality of circumstances. The official comments to section 379 ac-
knowledge that an agent may be required to exercise a higher de-
gree of care or skill than that care or skill that is standard for the
occupation in which the agent is employed. 29 Assessing care and
skill is not a simple matter. As the official comments indicate,
other factors such as the agreement, any special warranties, repre-
sentations that the agent made, the need for special knowledge,
the level of compensation, or the age and experience of the agent,
may have an effect on the assessment.30
Real estate agents are obviously not required to be complete
experts in other fields such as accounting, law, finance, abstracting,
surveying, engineering, or insurance. If they undertake functions
that these other practitioners normally perform, however, they
may have a difficult time defending a flawed performance, given
their fiduciary relationship with the buyer or seller.8
28. In Hagar v. Mobley, 638 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1981), the Wyoming Supreme Court, in
addressing the issue of professional liability for real estate agents, seems to have left open
the possibility of a higher standard:
Realtors, just like doctors, lawyers, engineering consultants, and builders, hold
themselves out as professionals; it is their job to know their profession. People
rely on and trust them. Failure to comply with either the accepted standards in
the field or the standards society is willing to recognize as acceptable, is
actionable.
Id. at 138 (footnote omitted).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP AGENCY § 379 comment a (1958).
30. Id. comments a-d.
31. Lunden v. Smith, 53 Or. App. 776, 632 P.2d 1344 (1981), is an interesting example
of a court struggling through a standard of care and skill analysis. The Lunden suit centered
on financial information furnished during negotiations to the prospective buyers of a busi-
ness. The buyers brought a suit for rescission of the purchase when the financial informa-
tion was discovered to be erroneous. Although the sellers agreed to rescission before trial,
they nevertheless proceeded against the real estate broker, who handled the sale and calcu-
lated the erroneous financial information, for restitution of his commission. The purchase
agreement was contingent upon the sellers providing income information to the buyers.
When sellers informed the broker that the formal financial information concerning the busi-
ness was in the possession of an out-of-state accountant, the broker inquired whether the
profit and loss information could be gathered in some other way. On the sellers' suggestion,
the broker constructed statements from the business check register. These "income" state-
ments were transmitted to the buyers, actually showing only the cash flow of the business.
When the sellers ultimately received the accountant's statement, it showed a substantially
lower profit. This fact, however, was never communicated to the buyers or the broker.
19851
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C. Tort
The tort theory of negligence raises the same issue: how to de-
termine the applicable standard of care or level of skill for which a
real estate agent will be held accountable. The term "malpractice"
is frequently used in connection with the failure of a professional
to conform to an acceptable standard of care. In this regard, there
is a coincidence among principles of contract, agency, and tort the-
ory. The professional is not an absolute insurer with respect to per-
formance related problems. Instead, the standard used in most
malpractice inquiries involves a comparison of the professional's
conduct with that of other competent professionals in the same or
The trial court held that the broker was negligent and ordered restitution of the com-
mission. The broker appealed, contending that there was no evidence from which to infer
that a reasonably prudent real estate broker in the community would have known that the
accounting method was innaccurate and pointed to the fact that none of the witnesses testi-
fied that a broker should have expertise in accounting methods. The Oregon Court of Ap-
peals responded by saying that the broker had misunderstood the trial court's findings. Ac-
cording to the appeals court:
The finding is not that [the broker] was required to be an expert in accounting
to meet the standard of care for brokers, but that (1) he undertook to partici-
pate in the preparation and transmittal of the financial statements to persons
for whom he was a fiduciary; and (2) the mistakes in the statements were so
obvious that anyone involved in their preparation should have been aware of the
problems.
Id. at 779-80, 632 P.2d at 1346 (emphasis added). Because the broker prepared and trans-
mitted information that he admitted he did not understand, "[n]o expert testimony was
required to show that his conduct failed to meet the applicable standard of care." Id. at 781,
632 P.2d at 1347-48. Moreover, according to the court of appeals, the trial court's holding
was not that the broker was required to understand accounting methods, but that the bro-
ker "violated his duty by engaging voluntarily in an accounting exercise he did not under-
stand." Id. at 780, 632 P.2d at 1347. The court of appeals concluded that the vendor should
receive restitution of the commission he had paid to the real estate agent because it was the
agent's erroneous accounting that caused the rescission of the sale. Although the Lunden
court analyzed the case under a standard of care or skill analysis, the case could have been
analyzed, as the special concurrence noted, under a restoration to the status quo analysis.
Id. at 783, 632 P.2d at 1349.
The real estate agent in Lunden argued unsuccessfully that he had ensured that the
plaintiffs were independently advised by a banker and an accountant, and that because the
experts who provided this independent advice did not perceive the accounting error, he
should not have been expected to perceive it. Id. at 782, 632 P.2d at 1348. The real estate
agent's argument was based on the principle articulated in Prall v. Gooden, 226 Or. 554, 360
P.2d 759 (1961) (en banc), that a broker is required to "make his explanation commerisurate
with the education and understanding of the people he is dealing with, and if he is unable to
give competent advice he should allow them to obtain it elsewhere." Id. at 561, 360 P.2d at
762. The Lunden court observed, however, that the broker's problem arose because he did
more than allow the parties to seek independent advise-he participated in preparing the
data. According to the court, their defective advice did not cure the agent's failure of re-
sponsibility. 53 Or. at 782, 632 P.2d at 1348.
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similar locality.3 2 Problems arise when this test is applied to the
real estate agent situation. The real estate profession is in transi-
tion, and the individual professionals display a great diversity of
levels of skill. Professionalism and skill levels have increased sub-
stantially in recent years because of changing licensing standards
and market conditions. Although some real estate agents are quali-
fied to deal with complex and critical aspects of creatively financed
transactions, most agents are probably not. The fact that the du-
ties of lawyers and real estate agents overlap in the area of con-
tract preparation and negotiation further complicates the matter.
Consequently, it is difficult to identify an appropriate standard.
While it may not seem fair to compare the typical real estate agent
to a lawyer, it is also not fair to allow a client to suffer because a
real estate agent has assumed responsibilities that the agent is not
qualified to handle in the best interest of the client.
In addition to establishing a duty of care between the real es-
tate agent and the principal, the tort theory of negligence also es-
tablishes the duties to other parties. For example, in the typical
transaction in which the agent represents the seller, courts have
been increasingly inclined to rule that the real estate agent also
owes fairly substantial duties to the buyer.8" The fact that it is im-
possible for all acts of the agent to be in the best interest of both
the principal and nonprincipal complicates considerations of what
duties the agent owes to a nonprincipal such as a buyer.
32. E.g., Whitney v. Day, 100 Mich. App. 707, 300 N.W.2d 380 (1980); Richard v.
Staehle, 70 Ohio App. 2d 93, 434 N.E.2d 1379 (1980). For an analogous discussion of an
evolving professional standard of care regarding insurance brokers and agents, see Berg, A
Professional Standard of Care Is Applied to Agents & Brokers, The Nat'l Law J., Sept. 13,
1982, at 23, col. 1.
33. See Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959) (en banc); United Homes,
Inc. v. Moss, 154 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963); Sawyer Realty Group v. Jarvis Corp., 89 Ill.
2d 379, 432 N.E.2d 849 (1982); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980); Hagar v.
Mobley, 638 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1981); see also Sinclair, The Duty of The Broker to Purchasers
and Prospective Purchasers of Real Property in Illinois, 69 ILL. B.J. 260 (1981) (The typical
real estate transaction involves unsophisticated purchasers; therefore, the broker should be
required to make a full disclosure to the buyer to alert him of the conflict presented by a
broker's representation of both buyer and seller.); Casenote, Real Estate Brokers' Duties to
Prospective Purchasers-Funk v. Tifft, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 513 (A real estate broker should
disclose his interest in the property, as well as any competing bids that he submits on the
property, because such a disclosure would be beneficial to both buyer and seller.); Comment,
A Reexamination of the Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNE L. REv.
1343 (1972) (the public policy and deterrence basis of a fiduciary duty permits more fre-
quent suits by purchasers against real estate agents).
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D. Statutes
Real estate agents may also be held liable for violations of li-
censing statutes. These statutes usually set forth detailed stan-
-dards specifying when suspension or revocation of a license is ap-
propriate.3 There is little authority specifically recognizing civil
liability of real estate agents based solely on violations of licensing
statutes and regulations.3 5 In most real estate agent cases, the
court's discussion of statutory violations is merged with the discus-
sion of duties under contract, agency, or tort law. It is common for
statutes designed to protect the public to play a special role in the
context of negligence. In some jurisdictions, the violation is treated
34. E.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 15 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1984), provid-
ing that a license shall be revoked or suspended where:
(6)(A) making a material misrepresentation, or failing to disclose to a potential
purchaser . . . any . . . defect known to the broker or salesman . . . ; or (B)
making a false promise of a character likely to influence, persuade, or induce any
person to enter into a contract or agreement when the licensee could not or did
not intend to keep such promise; or (C) pursuing a continued and flagrant course
of misrepresentation or making of false promises through agents, salesmen, ad-
vertising, or otherwise; or (D) failing to make clear, to all parties to a transac-
tion, which party he is acting for . . . ; or (I) soliciting, selling, or offering for
sale real property under a scheme or program that constitutes a lottery or decep-
tive practice . . . ; or (K) guaranteeing, authorizing, or permitting a person to
guarantee that future profits will result from a resale of real property . . . ; or
(P) publishing, or causing to be published, an advertisement including, but not
limited to, advertising by newspaper, radio, television, or display which is mis-
leading, or which is likely to deceive the public, or which in any manner tends to
create a misleading impression. . . ; or (U) failing to advise a purchaser in writ-
ing before the closing of a transaction that the purchaser should either have the
abstract covering the real estate which is the subject of the contract examined
by an attorney of the purchaser's own selection, or be furnished with or obtain a
policy of title insurance; or (V) conduct which constitutes dishonest dealings,
bad faith, or untrustworthiness; or (W) acting negligently or incompetently in
performing an act for which a person is required to hold a real estate license
The Texas statute also provides for suspension or revocation for engaging in the unau-
thorized practice of law. Id. art. 6573a, § 16; see also FLA. STAT. § 475.25(1)(j) (1983) ("(1)
The commission may deny an application for licensure . . . if it finds that the licensee ...
(j) [h]as rendered an opinion that the title to any property sold is good or merchantable,
except when correctly based upon a current opinion of a licensed attorney-at-law, or has
failed to advise a prospective purchaser to consult his attorney on the merchantability of
the title or to obtain title insurance."); MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-35-21(n) (Supp. 1983) ("No
real estate broker shall practice law or give legal advice directly or indirectly . . . . [N]or
shall he prevent or discourage any party to a real estate transaction from employing the
services of an attorney. ... ) In some jurisdictions, misbehavior of an individual member
of a firm may affect the licenses held by other members in the firm. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §
12-61-113(2) (1978); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 452.14(4) (West Supp. 1983).
35. E.g., Sawyer Realty Group v. Jarvis Corp., 89 Ill. 2d 379, 432 N.E.2d 849 (1982);
McGaha v. Dishman, 629 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. App. 1982) (dicta).
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as negligence per se.30 In other jurisdictions, these violations are
treated as merely establishing a presumption, inference, or evi-
dence of negligence. 7 Because of the many different state licensing
law statutes and regulations for real estate agents and the varied
views among the jurisdictions concerning negligence per se and re-
lated concepts, it is not appropriate within this article to proceed
with a detailed analysis of those concepts. It is sufficient to note
that a serious argument for civil liability could be made with re-
spect to these statutory provisions and creative financing fact
situations.3 8
Practice of law statutes also may serve as a basis for real es-
tate agent liability. Real estate agent responsibility in unconven-
tional transactions and the unauthorized practice of law seem inex-
tricably related. The unauthorized practice of law has long been a
topic of concern for real estate agents, lawyers, and others focusing
on protecting the public. Yet most of the states' laws remain vague
on the issue of determining the permissible boundaries of real es-
tate agent activities.3 9 Most of the attention given to this issue re-
lates to document preparation. In this respect, there is general
agreement that a real estate agent's preparation of contracts,
36. E.g., Noland v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 207 Kan. 72, 483 P.2d 1029 (1971) (breach of
a duty imposed by statutory law or by municipal ordinance constitutes negligence per se
and provides the basis of recovery of damages proximately resulting therefrom); Ratliff v.
Duke Power Co., 268 N.C. 605, 151 S.E.2d 641 (1966) (violation of statute imposing a duty
to protect others is negligence per se unless statute provides otherwise); Phoenix Refining
Co. v. Powell, 251 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (when violation of criminal statute
shown, violator is guilty of negligence as a matter of law).
37. E.g., Young v. Dodson, 239 Ark. 143, 388 S.W.2d 94 (1965); Ellis v. Caprice, 96 N.J.
Super. 539, 233 A.2d 654 (App. Div. 1967); Glatt v. Feist, 156 N.W.2d 819 (N.D. 1968). For
the basic test to determine whether a court should adopt the requirements of a statute or
regulation as the standard of conduct of a reasonable person, see the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTs §§ 286-88 (1965).
38. Liability based on violation of a licensing statute provision would extend to parties
other than the principal. See Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 25 So. 2d 4 (1946).
Generally speaking an agent is responsible only to his principal. This, however,
is different. The broker in Florida occupies a status under the law with recog-
nized privileges and responsibilities. The broker . . . belongs to a privileged class
and enjoys a monopoly to engage in a lucrative business ...
• . . Those dealing with a licensed broker may naturally assume that he pos-
sesses the requisites of an honest, ethical man.
Id. at 47-198, 25 So. 2d at 4-15; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text.
39. See generally D.B. BURKE, LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS, ch. 8 (1982)(discussing
the conflict between attorneys' and brokers' liability for negligence); Shedd, Real Estate
Agents and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 10 REAL EST. L.J. 135 (1981) (examining the
leading judicial decisions on the issue of real estate agents and the unauthorized practice of
law and defining the area where real estate agents may "walk freely" and the area where
they should "fear to tread").
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deeds, mortgages, or other legal documents, for a transaction in
which the agent is not otherwise involved, definitely constitutes
the unauthorized practice of law. 40 On the other hand, however,
the only document preparation that clearly may be undertaken
with impunity is the creation of the listing agreement establishing
the agency relationship and the preparation of the simplest of of-
fers and acceptances incident to a normal representation."1 The
treatment of what lies in between varies considerably among the
jurisdictions and lacks a comfortable degree of clarity in most of
those jurisdictions.
The majority of states have accepted that real estate brokers
may fill in the blanks in certain standardized form documents that
a lawyer has approved.' Some states limit this activity, taking the
position that only licensed lawyers may handle deeds, mortgages,
and other documents that form the muniments of title."' The rela-
tively big blanks that anticipate considerable additional terms in
lawyer-approved forms have been the subject of surprisingly little
attention. The few cases suggest that a lawyer-approved form con-
tract or offer that includes inserts prepared by a real estate agent
who is providing for a creatively financed transaction would proba-
bly exceed what the courts have sanctioned in terms of "filling in
40. E.g., Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Kelly, 421 S.W.2d 829 (Ky. 1967); Hulse v. Criger,
363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952) (en banc). Representation in court is another fairly cer-
tain example of unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g., Heiskell v. Mozie, 82 F.2d 861 (D.C.
Cir. 1936) (realtor acting as owner's agent not entitled personally to conduct landlord and
tenant proceeding because he was not an attorney at law); Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Haldane,
182 Ga. 833, 187 S.E. 68 (1936) (evidence insufficient to show that defendant corporation
and its agent were involved in the unauthorized practice of law).
41. See Shedd, supra note 39, at 138; see also Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d
855 (1952) (en banc).
42. E.g., Pope County Bar Ass'n v. Suggs, 274 Ark. 250, 624 S.W.2d 828 (1981); Con-
way-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957) (en
banc); In re Matthews, 58 Idaho 772, 79 P.2d 535 (1938); State ex rel. Indiana State Bar
Ass'n v. Indiana Real Estate Ass'n, 244 Ind. 214, 191 N.E.2d 711 (1963); Ingham County Bar
Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713 (1955); State ex rel. Reynolds v.
Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961).
A unique situation exists in Arizona where the state constitution empowers real estate
licensees to draft or fill out and complete, without charge, any and all instruments "includ-
ing, but not limited to, preliminary purchase agreements and earnest money receipts, deeds,
mortgages, leases, assignments, releases, contracts for sale of realty, and bills of sale." Aaiz.
CONST. art. XXVI, § 1. This constitutional amendment was the product of a popular vote
initiated by real estate licensees to overturn State Bar v. Arizona Land Title and Trust Co.,
90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961) (en banc), a decision that had severely restricted the ability of
nonlawyers to prepare real estate documents.
43. E.g., Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1950) (en banc);
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214 N.E.2d 771 (1966).
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blanks."44
it is even less clear whether a real estate agent is involved in
the unauthorized practice of law when he advises persons regard-
ing their legal rights. In structuring the unconventional transaction
there are numerous choices that must be made, each with specific
legal consequences. Preparing an appropriate contract would nec-
essarily involve giving legal advice. As a result, one must seriously
question whether it is possible for a real estate agent to structure a
creatively financed transaction without the assistance of a lawyer
and avoid engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. 5
44. See, e.g., South Suburban Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Homestead Realty, Inc., No. 75-CH-
4297 (Dec. 9, 1977), summarized in Jones, Homestead Clarifies Quinlan-Tyson Decision
and Sets Precedent for Future, 1978 ILL. B.J. 512-13 (blank space does not include the large
space left blank on a form contract between the last line of text and the place for the parties
signature); State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 91 N.M. 434, 575 P.2d 943 (1978)
(Filling in blanks in real estate legal instruments, when forms have been drafted by attor-
ney, and when filling in blanks requires only use of common knowledge regarding informa-
tion to be inserted, does not constitute the practice of law; but, when filling in blanks affects
substantial legal rights and if reasonable protection of such rights requires legal skill and
knowledge greater than that of average citizen, then the activity should be performed by a
lawyer.); Duncan & Hill Realty, Inc. v. Department of State, 62 A.D.2d 690, 405 N.Y.S.2d
339, (App. Div. 1978) (where detailed terms of purchase money mortgage were inserted in
offer by broker, broker was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law); Martineau v.
Greaser, 19 Ohio Op. 2d 374, 182 N.E.2d 48 (1962) (real estate agent engaged in unautho-
rized practice of law when she wrote in contract to purchase form that purchase price was to
be financed with $2,000 as a downpayment, this being more than "'simple, factual mate-
rial' "); Ralph R. Greer & Co. v. McGinnis, 6 Ohio Misc. 264, 217 N.E.2d 890 (Columbus
Mun. Ct. 1965) (various provisions added after "remarks" relating to contingencies and obli-
gations affecting parties, in single page printed form real estate purchase and sale contract
drawn by real estate agent went far beyond mere scrivening and constituted the unautho-
rized practice of law); Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41
Wash. 2d 697, 251 P.2d 619 (1952) (en banc) (preparation of a statutory warranty deed that
included an assumption of mortgage clause was unauthorized practice of law); cf. People ex
rel. Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 87 N.E.2d 773 (1949) (en banc). In Schafer,
the court stated:
One who merely fills in certain blanks when other pertinent information should
be elicited and considered is rendering little service but is acting in a manner
calculated to produce trouble. When filling in blanks as directed he may not by
that simple act be practicing law, but if he elicits the proper information and
considers it and advises and acts thereon he would in all probability be practic-
ing law. In other words, if his service does not amount to the practice of law it is
without material value; but if it is of material value it would amount to the
practice of law.
Id. at 54, 87 N.E.2d at 777-78.
45. Cf. Wolfenberger v. Madison, 43 Ill. App. 3d 813, 357 N.E.2d 656 (1976) (real estate
broker who counseled vendor on tax consequences of various forms of property transfer
would most certainly be engaged in activities that constitute the unauthorized practice of
law); Duncan & Hill Realty, Inc. v. Department of State, 62 A.D.2d 690, 405 N.Y.S. 2d 339
(App. Div. 1978) (where insertion of terms in contract constitutes the giving of legal advice,
the broker or agent must refrain from offering his services therefor). Article 17 of the Code
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The threat of criminal prosecution, no doubt, serves to elimi-
nate many potentially abusive activities in the area of the unau-
thorized practice of law. Also, there is a considerable record of
state and local bar associations having policed activities of real es-
tate agents by initiating challenges to certain alleged unauthorized
practices."' Because the existing authority is divided, 7 however, it
of Ethics of the National Association of Realtors (1974) provides that real estate agents
"shall not engage in activities that constitute the unauthorized practice of law and shall
recommend that legal counsel be obtained when the interest of any party to the transaction
requires it."
46. See, e.g., Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Block, 230 Ark. 430, 323 S.W.2d 912 (1959); Con-
way-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957); Chicago
Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214 N.E.2d 771 (1966); State ex rel.
Indiana State Bar Ass'n v. Indiana Real Estate Ass'n, 244 Ind. 214, 191 N.E.2d 711 (1963);
Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713 (1955).
In some locales realtors and attorneys have resolved their differences extrajudicially.
For example, in 1966, the Chicago and Illinois bar associations and the brokerage boards
reached an accord. The accord allowed real estate agents to complete preliminary or earnest
money contracts customarily used in their locale by filling in only factual and business de-
tails in appropriate blanks and to add to or delete from such forms only factual statements
and business details that the principals furnished that were necessary to conform to the
particular factual situation. The accord, however, prohibited real estate agents from prepar-
ing any document necessary to carry out or implement the contract. The Illinois Real Estate
Broker-Lawyer Accord, art. 1, reprinted in 32 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS 1, 4 (1966);
see also Connecticut Realtor-Lawyer Agreement, reprinted in Realtor-Lawyer Principles
Adopted, 40 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS 177 (1977); Statement of Principles by the
Washington Board of Realtors, Inc. and The Bar Association of the District of Columbia,
35 D.C. B.J. Aug.-Sept.-Oct. 1968, at 16.
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court approved an agreement between the state bar
and realtor associations defining permissible document preparation activities by real estate
licensees. New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. New Jersey Ass'n of Realtor Bds., 93 N.J. 470, 461
A.2d 1112 (1983) (the court upheld the consent judgment, but modified it to conform to the
requirements of the plain language law that requires that consumer contracts be expressed
in a simple, clear, understandable, and easily readable way). Licensees are permitted to pre-
pare certain residential sales contracts and leases provided that the contract contains pre-
scribed statements, conspicuously at the top of the first page and in detail within the text of
the contract, which state that the parties have a right to consult an attorney who can review
and cancel the contract by giving notice of disapproval within three business days after
delivery of the signed contract by the licensee to the parties. Id. at 475, 461 A.2d at 1115.
This novel agreement and the court's opinion are thought provoking. Based on public hear-
ings and trial testimony the superior court chancery, which initially presided over the mat-
ter, upheld the accord and stated that the agreement would serve the public interest be-
cause it renders contracts for the sale of residential property subject to prompt review by an
attorney. 186 N.J. Super 391, 452 A.2d 1323 (1982).
Justice Schreiber of the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a highly critical dissenting opin-
ion, charged that the new rule was against the public interest and went far beyond permit-
ting realtors to fill in blanks in a form by authorizing them to "negotiate and draft the
entire contract" and thus "countenances the practice of law by those not qualified as law-
yers." 93 N.J. at 483, 461 A.2d at 1120. Justice Schreiber also expressed concern over the
attorney cancellation power:
Why the attorney, and not the party, should be given that power is unclear.
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is not clear whether persons who have suffered losses in connection
Vesting the attorney . . . with the power of revocation means that when a party
changes his mind about a transaction he must engage a lawyer. Thus the protec-
tion of unilateral rescission will only be available for those individuals who are
willing to pay and can afford to hire an attorney. Moreover, there is merit in the
comment of Legal Services of New Jersey, Inc. when it writes: "'Attorney disap-
proval' seems to place the entire burden of decision on the attorney, which
would be highly questionable ethically and undesirable as a practical matter.
The attorney may think certain provisions are unwise or loose, but for any num-
ber of reasons be unwilling to take a rigid stand of disapproval . ..."
Indeed, the clause is unclear as to whether the right of revocation depends
upon the attorney's reason, if any.
Id. at 485, 461 A.2d at 1121.
According to Justice Schreiber, the new rule is a product of "the economic interests of
the realtors and attorneys, rather than societal interests." Id. Because under the accord the
real estate licensees' contract activities are restricted to residential sales of one to four
dwelling units or vacant one-family lots and residential leases of a term of one year or more,
real estate agents will be preparing contracts for "mostly low and moderate income individ-
uals who are buying or leasing homes . . . .[O]nly when the financial stakes are likely to be
higher must the realtor step aside to be replaced by the attorney." Id. In Justice Schreiber's
view, "[i]f a line must be drawn within which realtors may practice law, it would seem ap-
propriate that it depend on the subject matter of the advice and the nature of the realtor's
acts, rather than the type of structure to be conveyed." Id.
In its new creative financing disclosure statute, the California Legislature also used the
four family unit distinction. See infra text accompanying notes 99-129. There, in the public
interest, the line was drawn in the opposite direction. The California Legislature acted in
recognition of the need for special protection for the parties in these smaller transactions.
Apparently, it is assumed that the larger transactions typically will involve more sophisti-
cated parties with adequate counsel.
47. See, e.g., Torres v. Fiol, 110 Ill. App. 3d 9, 441 N.E.2d 1300 (1982) (cause of action
grounded on nonattorney's alleged negligent and unauthorized practice of law was cogniza-
ble); Rathke v. Lidisky, 59 Ill. App. 3d 560, 375 N.E.2d 871 (1978) (statute prohibiting un-
authorized practice of law and punishing violators by contempt does not allow private cause
of action); Kronzer v. First Nat'l Bank, 305 Minn. 415, 235 N.W.2d 187 (1975) (although
disposing of the case on other grounds, the court set out the criteria for a negligence per se
analysis on the basis of a violation of the unauthorized practice of law statute and character-
ized a damage action based on the statute as an open question); Janssen v. Guaranty Land
Title Co., 571 S.W.2d 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (dismissed statutory claim against title com-
pany based on the unauthorized practice of law, noting that traditional claims based on
fraud or negligence were available); Hecomovich v. Nielsen, 10 Wash. App. 563, 518 P.2d
1081 (1974) (one who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for the damages
caused, and the standard of care applied is the same as the standard applied to those li-
censed to practice law); Burien Motors, Inc. v. Balch, 9 Wash. App. 573, 513 P.2d 282 (1973)
(duty owed by one who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is the same as the duty
owed by an attorney). The Washington courts have taken the strongest stand on this issue.
In one early case, Mattieligh v. Poe, 57 Wash. 2d 203, 356 P.2d 328 (1960) (en banc), the
court seemed to enunciate a standard of strict liability:
The appellant's proof was that the contract prepared by respondent [bro-
ker] was at variance in many particulars with his instructions. When a broker
undertakes to practice law, he is liable for negligence. It is immaterial whether
the broker's attempt to prepare a contract, such as had been authorized by his
client, failed because of his ignorance, stupidity, incompetence, negligence or
fraud.
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with creatively financed real estate transactions will be able to use
the unauthorized practice of law as a basis for a private civil action
against real estate agents for damages.48 It is equally unclear
whether engaging in the unauthorized practice of law will affect
the standard of care for which the real estate agent will be held
accountable.49
State consumer protection statutes are an additional basis of
liability that may be used against real estate agents for problems
arising in creatively financed transactions. Courts often define the
scope of these statutes as broad enough to cover real estate con-
tracts. Several recent cases have concerned the real estate agents'
duties to disclose under state consumer protection laws.5 0
III. THE DEVELOPING CASE LAW AUTHORITY
Notwithstanding the coverage in a number of newspaper re-
ports, 1 very few of the actions against real estate agents brought
Id. at 204, 356 P.2d at 329 (citation omitted). For a case discussing possible strict liability,
see also Wright v. Langdon, 274 Ark. 258, 623 S.W.2d 823 (1981).
48. In addition to serving as a sword for an injured victim, the unauthorized practice of
law concept could serve as a shield for a real estate agent. An agent may be able to argue
that he could not provide a service because to do so would have constituted the practice of
law. Cf. Morley v. J. Pagel Realty & Ins., 27 Ariz. App. 62, 550 P.2d 1104 (1976) (discussed
infra in the text accompanying notes 52-59) (where the court was careful to characterize the
duty to warn of the need for security as banal advice distinguishable from legal advice con-
stituting the practice of law).
49. One commentator has chided that the prevailing definition of the practice of law is
"somewhat contrived in the face of a doctrine that allows. . . personal injury specialists but
not real estate brokers to consummate title and closing arrangements." Rhode, Why the
ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEx. L. REv. 689, 705
(1981) (footnote omitted). It must be remembered, however, that the lawyer who is not
skilled in the real estate practice but who undertakes complex functions will nonetheless be
held to the standard of care of a lawyer who is skilled in the real estate area. It seems
reasonable that the same should be true of a real estate agent performing a function that
lawyers normally perform. See Olson v. Neale, 116 Ariz. 522, 570 P.2d 209 (1977) (If a real
estate agent "can practice law in the area of real property sales, it is reasonable to hold him
to a full understanding of the implications and ramifications of the Statute of Frauds.");
Wright v. Langdon, 274 Ark. 258, 263, 623 S.W.2d 823, 826 (1981) ("reason urges that the
standard should be no less than that required of a licensed attorney, and conceivably an
even higher standard would be appropriate-strict liability, for example, to deter those who
might be otherwise tempted to profess a competence they have no right to claim"); see also
Real Estate Law Newsletter, Contract and Conveyance Documents-Broker Beware, 11
COLo. LAW. 2383 (1982); Riggs, Unauthorized Practice and the Public Interest: Arizona's
Recent Constitutional Amendment, 37 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 11-13 (1964).
50. E.g., Young v. Joyce, 351 A.2d 857 (Del. 1975); Bartner v. Carter, 405 A.2d 194 (Me.
1979); McRae v. Bolstad, 32 Wash. App. 173, 646 P.2d 771 (1982); Wilkinson v. Smith, 31
Wash. App. 1, 639 P.2d 768 (1982).
51. See, e.g., Andrew, Suits Against Realtors Grow As Financing Balloons Burst, Wall
St. J., Sept. 1, 1982, at 17, col. 1.
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for creative financing failures have progressed to the point of gen-
erating appellate court decisions. The few reported judicial opin-
ions display the willingness of some courts to aid the victim of a
real estate agent's incompetence or poor advice. The cases dis-
cussed in this section arguably point the way toward the imposi-
tion of broad liability upon a real estate agent who has caused
losses by failing to soundly structure the transaction, to adequately
advise the parties or, when appropriate, to make referrals to more
qualified advisors.
The two following cases illustrate that, at a minimum, real es-
tate agents should advise their clients that debt should be ade-
quately or properly secured. In Morley v. J. Pagel Realty & Insur-
ance,5 2 the agent listed the plaintiffs' home for sale at an asking
price of $15,000-$3,000 down and the balance payable pursuant
to a fifteen-year, eight percent note. The agent brought plaintiffs
an offer for the full asking price but with $2,500 down and the
balance payable by a ten-year eight percent note. Upon closing the
deal, the buyers executed a $12,500 note. "The form used for the
note included the words 'This note is secured by a mortgage on
real property,' but these words were crossed out."' Shortly there-
after, the buyers deeded the property to a third party for cash,
defaulted on the note, and went bankrupt. Plaintiffs sued the real
estate firm for damages of $11,900, alleging breach of fiduciary
duty and negligence in failing to inform them of the unsecured na-
ture of the buyer's offer, and of the advisability of requiring a
mortgage.
The trial court ruled in favor of the real estate firm, reasoning
that to require a real estate agent to give advice that a promissory
note should be secured by a mortgage would be to require the
agent to illegally engage in the practice of law.54 As a result, the
boundaries of the lawyer's exclusive domain-the practice of
law-complicated the inquiry of the real estate agent's standard of
care.
The Arizona Court of Appeals, drawing on decisions from
other states, 55 recited a series of operative rules. First, "a real es-
52. 27 Ariz. App. 62, 550 P.2d 1104 (1976). For a detailed discussion of this case and
related events of significance in Arizona see Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liabil-
ity: Arizona's Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, 20 ARiz. L. REV. 767 (1978).
53. Morley, 27 Ariz. App. at 62, 550 P.2d at 1105.
54. Id.
55. Starkweather v. Shaffer, 262 Or. 198, 497 P.2d 358 (1972) (dictum) (real estate bro-
ker must make a full and understandable explanation to his client before having him sign
any contract); Prall v. Gooden, 226 Or. 554, 561, 360 P.2d 759, 762 (1961) ("The broker
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tate [agent] must make some kind of explanation of the offer he
procures for his client. '56 Second, "if the offer varies from the
terms of the listing, the [agent] must so inform his client. ' 57 Third,
an agent acting for "an inexperienced client must employ all his
professional ability and knowledge to make sure the client under-
stands the 'facts' that will materially affect his desire to sell in ac-
cordance with the terms of a purchase offer." 58 The court observed
that although the average person may not be very familiar with
mortgages, the desirability of securing property with a mortgage is
common knowledge in the real estate business. The court therefore
concluded that by failing to inform the client that the note should
be secured, the real estate agent had breached his duty to effect a
sale on the best terms possible and to disclose all the relevant in-
formation. Rejecting the unauthorized practice of law defense, the
Morley court characterized the mere "duty to warn the untutored
vendor that he should require some form of security in the con-
tract of sale" as "banal advice" that "creates no danger to the
public."5 9
In Townsend v. Doss,60 the Arkansas Court of Appeals. simi-
larly held a real estate agent liable for failing to safeguard a seller's
interest. Townsend, the listing agent, presented an offer from a
buyer who was to assume an existing loan and pay the balance in
cash. Although the closing was to occur on September 10, 1979,
$7,000 of the "downpayment" was not due until November 20,
1979. A warranty deed granting the property to the buyer was re-
corded on September 10th, but the $7,000 was never paid. The
seller brought an action against both the defaulting buyer and the
real estate agent. The trial court found the agent negligent in han-
dling the transaction and granted judgment in favor of the seller. 1
On appeal the agent argued that he neither breached any con-
should make his explanation commensurate with the education and understanding of the
people he is dealing with, and if he is unable to give competent advice he should allow them
to obtain it elsewhere."); Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 329 P.2d 410 (1958) (real estate
agent has duty to inform his principal of all facts that might influence his principal in ac-
cepting or rejecting the offer); Duncan v. Barbour, 188 Va. 53, 49 S.E.2d 260 (1948) (real
estate broker breached his duty to inform principal when he submitted amended purchase
offer to his client without disclosing that it failed to accord with the client's wishes in three
crucial respects).




60. 618 S.W.2d 173 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981).
61. Id. at 175.
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tractual obligation nor any regulation of the state real estate com-
mission. He further argued that the trial court's decision should be
reversed because there was no expert testimony at trial regarding
the standard of care that a real estate agent owes to a customer.
The Arkansas Court of Appeals responded:
It is the well-established rule that a real estate broker, who is
not a mere middleman, but is employed by a principal to act as
agent in a real-estate transaction is under a duty to exercise rea-
sonable care and skill, or that degree of care and skill ordinarily
employed by persons of common capacity engaged in the same
business, and that a broker is liable to his principal for all conse-
quences directly flowing from his failure to exercise such degree
of ordinary care and skill in the handling of the matter en-
trusted to him. 2
The Townsend court rejected the contention that specific evidence
of the appropriate standard of care was required. The court was
persuaded by the statement in Morley that persons of common ca-
pacity in the real estate business are well aware of the need for
security, and therefore real estate agents have a duty to inform
their customers of this need. In recognizing a duty of care with
respect to the security function, section 378 of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency also influenced the court.6 "
Narrowing in on the specific facts of the case, the Townsend
court observed that there was evidence in the record to show that
the real estate agent was aware of the prior financial problems of
the buyer; that the seller was concerned about the buyer's history
and the security for the balance of the downpayment; that the
seller expressed these concerns to the agent; that the agent dis-
couraged her from becoming personally involved in the details of
the transaction and assured her that if the balance was not paid
she could get her house back; and that the agent "made absolutely
no effort to secure (by mortgage or otherwise) the balance due
.... "" The court therefore affirmed the judgment for $7,000
against the real estate agent on the basis of his negligence, com-
menting that the agent's assurances that the seller could get her
house back in the event of a default buttressed the finding of
62. Id. at 174 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 468, 470 (1964).
63. See supra text accompanying note 14.
64. 618 S.W.2d at 175. The agent's only explanation for his failure was that he some-
how believed that the savings and loan that held the first mortgage "was going to hold the
deed rather than record it until a substantial sum had been paid on the amount due." Id.
The court found no evidence of such an escrow arrangement. Id.
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negligence.
Morley and Townsend thus stand as basic authority for im-
posing liability upon a real estate agent who fails to competently
counsel a customer regarding the financing of a real estate transac-
tion. Both cases, however, concerned relatively simple transactions,
and the courts were required to address only the fundamental er-
ror of an agent's failure to advise a customer to acquire security for
the unpaid portion of the sale price. It is certainly no great burden
to ask real estate agents to show this rather minimal regard for the
well being of their principals.
The case of Colley v. Tipton65 serves as another recent exam-
ple of a court imposing liability on a real estate agent in the con-
text of a seller financed transaction. In Colley, the defendant, a
real estate agent, failed to provide for interest on all the balances
that were to be paid over time. The listing agreement had specified
that eight percent interest would be due on any balance of the
purchase price that the sellers carried. In May 1979, the sellers'
real estate agent drafted an offer for prospective buyers in the
form of a proposed real estate contract. The offer provided for a
sale of the listed farm property at $171,000, with $10,000 to be
paid at the signing of the contract and $4,500 to be paid on De-
cember 31, 1979. An additional $35,000 was to be paid on Septem-
ber 1, 1980. The balance was "to be carried by seller for a period of
20 years at 8% intrest (sic) . . . . First payment to be made an-
naualy (sic) on December 31, 1981.""6 The buyers were to receive
possession on June 1, 1979 and a warranty deed on September 1,
1980, when the $35,000 was to be paid.
After the buyers signed this offer, the real estate agent
presented it to the sellers. According to the sellers, they did not
read the offer because the husband "did not have his glasses, and
because they believed that they would probably not understand it
anyway. ' '67 The real estate agent disputed this, claiming that the
sellers did read it and that the agent had explained the payment
terms to them. The agent admitted, however, that nothing was
said about interest from June 1, 1979 to September 1, 1980 on the
balance due after the $10,000 downpayment. Sometime after the
sellers accepted the offer, they called the agent to inquire whether
they would receive interest from June 1, 1979. The agent replied:
65. 657 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
66. Id. at 270.
67. Id.
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"'Whoever loaned money and didn't [receive] interest on it?' "68
The buyers subsequently took the position that the contract
did not require them to pay interest during that period. In the ac-
tion against the real estate agent that ultimately followed, the jury
awarded the sellers almost $24,000 in damages for lost interest. On
appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the jury's verdict.,9
There are a number of other decisions in which real estate
agents have lost commissions or been similarly held liable for
losses due to errors committed in structuring or overseeing trans-
actions.70 Although many of these cases have involved conventional
transactions, the reasoning behind most of these rulings also ap-
plies to more complicated unconventional contexts. For example,
failure to investigate suspected title problems;71 the character, suit-
ability, and financial responsibility of prospective parties;72 and the
suitability of the property, 73 have led to judgments against real es-
tate agents. Naturally, failure to disclose known problems is also
actionable.74 Real estate agents also have been found liable for fail-
68. Id.
69. See id. at 273.
70. One confusing aspect of the case law concerning real estate agent responsibilities is
the general lack of distinction between actions over real estate commissions and actions
involving broader issues of damages. The courts routinely apply authority from one context
to the other without comment. Although some of these applications are theoretically sound,
many seem questionable.
71. E.g., Wilson v. Hisey, 147 Cal. App. 2d 433, 305 P.2d 686 (1957) (failure of broker to
recommend that lessee obtain a title search and misrepresentation that there was only one
encumbrance of a certain amount against the property constituted negligence); Mayflower
Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 530 P.2d 1298 (Colo. 1975) (broker failed to make record search and
therefore did not discover existing second lien); Zee v. Assam, 336 N.W.2d 162 (S.D. 1983)
(negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in informing purchaser that title insurance was not
necessary); Hinrichs v. Brady, 23 S.D. 250, 121 N.W. 777 (1909) (broker failed to examine
note and therefore did not warn buyer that note had been paid in full and further failed to
advise that a tax lien encumbered the property).
72. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Edelen, 623 P.2d 418 (Colo. App. 1980) (real estate agent
breached duty of care by not ascertaining that corporation was two -months behind in rent
and contending that corporation was "solid"); Shatz Realty Co. v. King, 225 Ky. 846, 10
S.W.2d 456 (1928) (real estate agent is under a duty to make a reasonable inquiry and inves-
tigation to determine whether a prospective tenant is a suitable person); Bute v. Williams,
162 S.W. 989 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (agent who recklessly and innaccurately informed princi-
pal that prospective purchaser was a person of wealth and financial responsibility, thereby
inducing principal to accept notes from purchaser that proved to be worthless, was not enti-
tled to a commission for services, even though the misinformed statements about financial
worth were not made with intent to deceive).
73. E.g., Ford v. Cournale, 36 Cal. App. 3d 172, 111 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1973) (real estate
broker had a duty to investigate whether a property would produce sufficient income to
meet expenses).
74. E.g., Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976) ("negative
fraud" and "misrepresentation by false opinion" with respect to buyer); Prall v. Corum, 403
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ing to explain adequately the nature of a contract,75 to prepare
properly papers relating to a transaction,'7 6 and to see that the clos-
ing is carried out properly.77 There are relatively few decisions per-
So. 2d 991 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (broker's failure to disclose that he was the source of buyer's
downpayment was a material breach of fiduciary duty); Hare v. Bauer, 223 Minn. 285, 26
N.W.2d 359 (1947) (The agent concealed the fact that he advanced the earnest money pay-
ment from his own funds, and that the prospective purchaser was unable to go through with
the sale due to financial difficulties brought on by prolonged illness.).
75. E.g., Leigh v. Loyd, 74 Ariz. 84, 244 P.2d 356 (1952) (seller's broker held liable for
damages for intentionally remaining silent while his client signed certain legal instruments
under a serious misapprehension of their true nature); Monty v. Peterson, 85 Wash. 2d 956,
540 P.2d 1377 (1975) (broker failed to adequately emphasize importance of private restric-
tive covenants).
In Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 329 P.2d 410 (1958), the Utah Supreme Court de-
nied a real estate agent his commission for not making sufficiently clear to the principal who
was to pay off an existing mortgage and other encumbrances. The agent had taken a $45,000
listing on the seller's farm. The agent presented a contract that showed an offered purchase
price of $30,000 and stated that the property would be sold free of all encumbrances. The
seller misunderstood that he would receive $30,000 net, with the buyer paying off approxi-
mately $15,000 worth of encumbrances. The agent did not explain the nature of the offer to
the seller. In the action for the commission, the agent argued that he was under no "duty to
coddle and 'spoonfeed'" the seller because the seller had ample opportunity to read the
papers and he signed them voluntarily. The court responded:
The above contention is sound as between people dealing with each other
under usual circumstances. But the relationship of real estate agent and client
makes the situation quite different. The agent is issued a license and permitted
to hold himself out to the public as qualified by training and experience to
render a specialized service in the field of real estate transactions. There rests
upon him the responsibility of honestly and fairly representing the interests of
those who engage his services, and upon failing to do so his license may be re-
voked. Accordingly, persons who entrust their business to such agents are enti-
tled to repose some degree of confidence that they will be loyal to such trust and
that they will, with reasonable diligence and in good faith, represent the inter-
ests of their clients. Unless the law demands this standard, instead of being the
badge of competence and integrity it is supposed to be, he license would serve
only as a foil to lure the unsuspecting public. . . to be lduped by people more
skilled and experienced in such affairs than are they, when they would be better
off taking care of such business for themselves.
Id. at 122, 329 P.2d at 412.
76. E.g., Kimball Bridge Rd. v. Everest Realty Corp., 141 Ga. App. 835, 234 S.E.2d 673
(1977) (inadequate property description in sales contract; seller was not contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of law for failing to consult an attorney); Wisnieski v. Harms, 188 Neb. 721,
199 N.W.2d 405 (1972) (broker cannot recover compensation for services if negligent in
drawing a contract of sale for his principal); Mattlieligh v. Poe, 57 Wash. 2d 203, 356 P.2d
328 (1960) (contract that agent prepared was at variance with the instructions seller gave
him); Shaw v. Briggle, 193 Wash. 595, 76 P.2d 1011 (1938) (deed failed to provide for as-
sumption of notes).
77. E.g., Lester v. Marshall, 143 Colo. 189, 352 P.2d 786 (1960) (broker failed to pay off
deed of trust from funds paid to broker for that and other purposes); White v. Brock, 41
Colo. App. 156, 584 P.2d 1224 (1978) (closing papers not in conformity with sales contract);
Stewart v. Muse, 62 Ind. 385 (1878) (failure to record mortgage); Doane v. Knoxville Inv.
Corp., 159 Tenn. 76, 16 S.W.2d 186 (1929) (real estate agent liable for damages resulting
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taining to each of these examples of misconduct. Collectively, how-
ever, these decisions depict a growing territory of legal
responsibility for real estate agents s.7  The decisions lay the
groundwork for claims of real estate agent liability predicated
upon failure to counsel the seller and buyer about risks associated
with unconventional transactions and failure to ensure that certain
fundamental safeguards are provided.
In contrast to the ordinary real estate transaction, the cre-
atively financed transaction will typically present the real estate
agent with a broader range of matters to be investigated and dis-
closed, a greater number of papers to be prepared and explained,
and a far more complex closing to supervise. In short, there will be
many more potential pitfalls for the agent to overcome. The recent
decisions that follow illustrate the expanding purview of real estate
agent responsibility.
In Hurney v. Locke,79 the plaintiffs sued a real estate agent
and a broker for failing to adequately advise them about certain
regulations under a state mortgage subsidy program. In 1978 the
Hurneys purchased a home in Flandreau, South Dakota, with fi-
nancing arranged through the Western Bank of Sioux Falls. The
financing was through the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and
the South Dakota Housing and Development Authority (SDHDA),
and it carried a subsidized interest rate of seven and a half percent
per year on the unpaid balance. In November of that same year,
the Hurneys decided to sell their home and move to Sioux Falls.
Buck, a licensed real estate agent for the Locke Agency, called the
Hurneys and asked to represent them in the sale. The Hurneys
agreed because their own efforts were unsuccessful, and shortly
thereafter the agent presented a prospective buyer and offer to
them. Although the sellers rejected this offer, in subsequent negoti-
ations conducted through the agent, the buyers agreed to pay more
if they could assume the SDHDA mortgage. Locke, the agency bro-
ker, brought the buyers to Western Bank to discuss financing and
later arranged to hold the closing at Western Bank.
from failure to exercise due care in paying off note and securing a release of the trust deed);
cf. American Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Hardin-Stockton Corp., 671 S.W.2d 283 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984) (broker surrendered seller's deed that had been entrusted to him without simultane-
ously receiving the sale proceeds for the seller's account).
78. See generally D.B. BURKE, LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS chs. 4-8 (1982) (discussing
the potential liability of real estate brokers due to their fiduciary duties, and their relation-
ship to regulatory authorities, and with regard to civil rights, antitrust laws, and the broker/
attorney conflict).
79. 308 N.W.2d 764 (S.D. 1981).
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A crucial element in the Hurney sale transaction was a limita-
tion on SDHDA loans that would apply to the Hurneys if the buy-
ers assumed their SDHDA loan. On October 6, 1978, SDHDA sent
a memorandum to all participating lending institutions in South
Dakota reminding them of the importance of determining whether
a loan applicant had held an SDHDA loan in the past. If there had
been such a loan and the new purchasers assumed it, the applicant
could not apply for another SDHDA loan. The applicant might ap-
ply for a new loan, however, if the previous loan had been satisfied
or if a substitution of mortgagor was approved. Breidenbach, a
Western Bank employee, stated that he had informed the broker
at least twice of the risks to the Hurneys in permitting the as-
sumption, including when the broker first brought the buyers to
Western Bank to discuss financing. The broker admitted he had
been informed of the problem, but only a few days prior to the
scheduled closing. The sale closing occurred in Breidenbach's office
at Western Bank with the Hurneys and the broker in attendance.
Neither Breidenbach nor the broker informed the Hurneys of the
SDHDA memorandum on mortgage assumptions.
Subsequently, the Hurneys found a home that they wanted to
buy in Sioux Falls. When they applied at Western Bank for financ-
ing, they were told for the first time of their ineligibility for an-
other SDHDA loan. Because they were unable to obtain an
SDHDA loan, they resorted to conventional financing, which re-
quired a larger down-payment and a higher interest rate on the
unpaid balance. The Hurneys sued the real estate agent and the
broker for the cost differential between SDHDA financing and the
conventional financing they actually obtained. Additionally, the
Hurneys sought exemplary damages for the intentional and fraud-
ulent failure to inform them of the SDHDA loan limitation. The
real estate agent and the broker impleaded Breidenbach and West-
ern Bank as third-party defendants. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of all defendants. The trial court's decision
regarding the agent and the broker was based on a ruling that they
were merely "middlemen," apparently owing a less substantial
duty to their customer.
The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed on appeal, holding
that the trial court's use of the middleman distinction was errone-
ous. The supreme court explained that this distinction was only
useful when the issue was a real estate agent's right to collect com-
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missions from both parties to a real estate transaction." Here the
issue was whether the agent and the broker had breached a duty to
inform their customers of the risk in permitting assumption of
their mortgage. The court wrote:
A real estate agent is a licensed professional holding himself
out as trained and experienced to render a specialized service in
real estate transactions . . . . Clients rely on the agent's exper-
tise and expect the agent to act in their best interests . . . . For
these reasons, the relationship between real estate agent or bro-
ker and the principal is confidential and fiduciary . . . . Locke
and Buck owe appellants a duty of utmost good faith, integrity
and loyalty.
Unless otherwise agreed, Locke and Buck owe their princi-
pals, like appellants, a duty to use reasonable efforts to fully,
fairly and timely disclose information to their principals within
their knowledge, which is or may be material to the subject mat-
ter of their agency."
The court further explained that the scope of a real estate
agent's duty is limited in several respects: it depends on the
agent's knowledge of the information allegedly withheld, on the
task entrusted to the agent, the agreement of the parties, their pre-
vious relations, and the facts of the situation. 2 The real estate
agent and the broker argued that they owed no duty regarding fi-
nancing details. They also argued that the bank was duty bound to
inform the seller because it acted as the seller's agent for the pur-
pose of financing. The court observed, however, that the broker
had determined that the mortgage was assumable, had advised of
the counter-offer that included the mortgage assumption, and was
present at the closing. The court thus remanded the case for a de-
termination of the issues of fact concerning the scope of the agent's
duty.
The Hurney case is somewhat limited as authority for real es-
tate agent liability for creative financing failures. First, the court
did not go so far as to rule as a matter of law that real estate
agents always assume responsibility for safeguarding against
problems related to the financial complexities of transactions. Al-
80. See id. at 768 (citing Langford v. Issenhuth, 28 S.D. 451, 134 N.W. 889 (1912)).
81. Hurney, 308 N.W.2d at 768 (footnote omitted).
82. Id. at 769. For an example of circumstances negating the duty to inform, see Bel-
leau v. Hopewell, 120 N.H. 46, 411 A.2d 456 (1980) (no breach of the duty to inform because
the principal was primarily interested in a deposit and contract for sale and it was not
shown that the principal wanted information on the buyer).
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though the court's observations about the broker's and the agent's
activities suggest an inclination toward holding them responsible
in this case, the court ultimately turned the question back to the
trial court for a factual determination. Thus, the issue of responsi-
bility was not resolved on the basis of status alone. The factors of
"knowledge," "task," "agreement, .... previous relations," and "facts
of the situation," which the court listed in regard to a determina-
tion of the scope of a real estate agent's duty, suggest that the
court is seeking a measure of intent and reasonable expectations
based on the totality of the relationship. Second, it is unclear from
a reading of the case report to what extent actual knowledge was a
necessary ingredient to the cause of action. A fiduciary duty to dis-
close known material information is not novel. When a real estate
agent takes an active role in structuring financing, the agent will
surely be required to fully inform the principal of known material
information. One should further consider, however, the extent to
which an agent's fiduciary duties may extend beyond that which is
actually known. The Hurney court leaves the impression that the
agent and the broker would probably not have been liable if they
had not been specifically notified of the SDHDA loan limitation.
In addition to the duty of good faith or loyalty, an agent owes
a duty of due care and skill. As a result, matters that are not
known should also present a potential threat of liability. Mere ig-
norance of operative laws and pertinent facts will surely not serve
as an automatic defense for the real estate agent involved in struc-
turing an unconventional transaction.
In Peirce v. Horn, 3 the California Court of Appeals for the
First District addressed the issue of a real estate agent's duty of
good faith and care in the context of arranging loans for a cus-
tomer. Peirce, a seventy-seven year-old widow, who owned her resi-
dence and several rental properties, was having financial trouble.
She sought the assistance of Hom, a licensed real estate broker
with an office near her residence, whom she had known on a non-
business basis for several years. She asked Hom to arrange a loan
on one of her properties. He arranged a loan secured by a second
deed of trust, charging her a fee. A couple of months later, re-
sponding to a similar request, Hom arranged another loan for
Peirce on identical terms securing another property. During the
83. 126 Cal. App. 3d 193, 178 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1981) (The case was initially reported in
the advance sheets, but by order of the Supreme Court of California dated January 27, 1982,
the Reporter of Decisions was directed without explanation to delete the opinion.).
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next year, without Hom's assistance, Peirce borrowed money from
several other parties, some of these debts being secured by other of
her properties. Eventually, Peirce was unable to keep up with her
loan payments and all of the lenders foreclosed. She then filed an
action against Horn for certain statutory violations and breach of
fiduciary duty.
The statutory claim in Peirce concerned the broker's fee and
the balloon payment. Hom's fee clearly exceeded a statutory" ten
percent limitation by a few percentage points. Additionally, the
payment schedule for the loans clearly failed to conform with an-
other operative statute. California law provided that in an install-
ment loan of less than three years duration "[n]o installment in-
cluding the final installment shall be greater than twice the
amount of the smallest installment." 85 The loans Hom arranged
were payable in twenty-three monthly installments of fifty dollars
and a final installment of $1,900. Nevertheless, the trial court
found in favor of the real estate agent because, according to the
court, the loans were not usurious or oppressive or in willful viola-
tion of the statutes.
In its opinion, which was subsequently withdrawn from the of-
ficial California reporter, the Court of Appeals rephrased the in-
quiry regarding the commission overcharge. The court noted that
the statute provided for a treble excess recovery unless the excess
is the result of a bona fide error. 6 The court concluded that the
evidence failed to support the finding of a bona fide error; it
showed simply that Hom was "ignorant or mistaken as to the
law."'87 The court also differed regarding the balloon payment. Ac-
cording to the court, there was a clear statutory violation, and an
appropriate remedy could be fashioned.
The evidence regarding whether the broker had breached his
fiduciary duties was somewaht contradictory. At the trial Hom had
testified that he had explained to Peirce the nature of her obliga-
tions and that she had no objections or questions. Peirce contra-
dicted this testimony by testifying that the terms of the loans had
never been fully explained, but that she simply placed her trust in
Horn. Evidence further showed that Hom believed Peirce intended
to use the loan proceeds to pay bills; he did not know of her other
indebtedness, nor did he inquire of her ability to repay. The trial
84. CALIF. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10242(b)(2) (West 1964).
85. Id. § 10244.
86. Id. § 10246.
87. Peirce, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
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court determined that Horn had used reasonable care in advising
Peirce, had not fraudulently or negligently misrepresented the
terms of the loans to her, and had not breached the duty of a fidu-
ciary or trustee.88
On appeal, Peirce argued that Horn had breached his fiduciary
duty in two respects: first, by violating the statutes and, second, by
failing to inquire about her ability to repay and to advise her about
more prudent means of raising money on her property. Horn re-
plied that "he 'was not [her] financial advisor'" and that the evi-
dence did not show "in what manner [he] was negligent or careless,
or that he was incompetent, or acted in bad faith."8
The court of appeals viewed the matter quite differently than
the trial court. Because there was a fiduciary relationship, Horn
owed Peirce "the duty of acting with the highest good faith and
care."90 The court further noted that Peirce's age, infirmities, and
the confidence she reposed in him would also support the finding
of a confidential relation.9 Although the lack of a causal connec-
tion between the statutory violations and the loss of her properties
troubled the Peirce court, Peirce found a sympathetic ear regard-
ing the agent's failure to inquire about her ability to repay and the
agent's failure to render appropriate advice. The court wrote:
[The real estate licensee] is a professional agent who holds him-
self out to the public as having particular skills and knowledge
in the real estate field. When he undertakes to perform the ser-
vices of his agency he assumes an obligation to exercise greater
care and skill than is within the capacity of the ordinary citizen
.... [T]his increasingly expanding burden of professionalism
... is being imposed upon the licensee by the courts .... In
addition, the legislative changes to the Real Estate Law which
increased the degree of knowledge of real estate law and legal
principles required of the real estate licensee add measurably to
the scope of the licensee's professional obligations toward all of
the principals to the transaction .... 12 A mortgage [loan] bro-
ker is an agent procured by the borrower to obtain a loan. As a
real estate licensee he holds himself out as an expert on matters
pertaining to real estate loans, and his duty as agent is to use
88. Id. at 554-55.
89. Id. at 557.
90. Id. at 556.
91. Id. This status, though possibly of some effect, does not seem critical to the court's
handling of the issues.
92. Id. at 558 (quoting 1 MILLER & STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE,
pt. 2, § 4.19, at 59-60 (1975)).
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this expertise to his principal's advantage. After all, the bor-
rower is paying a substantial fee for his service.9 3
Appellant paid respondent over $800 in commissions. For
her money she was entitled to more than his finding a
lender. . . .She was also entitled to expert advice.
Respondent was not capable of rendering sound advice be-
cause he had no knowledge of appellant's financial condition. He
did not know, but he should have at least inquired into appel-
lant's circumstances as to whether she could reasonably be ex-
pected to be able to repay the loan. The lenders were secure, but
[Hom's] duty-the duty of highest good faith and care-was to
protect appellant. . . .His failure to make inquiry and to give
sound advice was a breach of the duty of a fiduciary or trustee.9 4
The court commented in a footnote that the degree of protection
required was a function of the principal's "experience and ability
to understand and evaluate real estate financing transactions. ' '95
The court thus concluded that the real estate agent had breached
his fiduciary duty and that his acts were a "substantial factor" in
bringing about Peirce's loss of those properties securing the debts
arranged by the agent.9
Although the unreported Peirce v. Horn opinion cannot be
cited as precedent, it presents a thought provoking illustration of
the expanding duties of real estate agents who become involved in
structuring financing. In holding the agent to the highest degree of
professional care the court has placed the agent in a position of
financial advisor. One might be inclined to think that the special
nature of this agency limits the holding. Peirce did not hire Hom
to perform the traditional selling function; she hired him to ar-
range a loan. The court's language and analysis seems equally ap-
plicable, however, to the more traditional arrangement. The re-
sponsibilities of the agent are clearly not expressed in terms of a
separate class of agent, as mortgage broker. To the contrary, the
mortgage broker's skill and duty are described in terms of a real
estate licensee. As a real estate licensee he holds himself out as an
expert on matters pertaining to real estate loans. The court stated
that the principal paid a substantial fee and was entitled to more
than just the finding of a lender. There is no reason to distinguish
93. Id. (quoting Wallin, Hard Money Secured Lending: Regulation and Practices from
the Viewpoint of Borrower Representation, 48 L.A. B. BULL. 284, 289 (1973)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 558 n.8.
96. Id. at 558.
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this fee and the associated service from the typical real estate com-
mission and service. Although a finder's fee can be earned by sim-
ply bringing forth a ready, willing, and able lender or buyer, typi-
cal real estate clients expect, and in recent times are being
increasingly led to expect that they will be guided through a com-
plicated and unfamiliar transaction. In the creatively financed sale,
application of the court of appeals' reasoning would seem to be
particularly justified because it is only through the real estate
agent's efforts and activities that the "ready and willing" buyer be-
comes "able." This activity is thus an integral part of earning the
commission.
The breadth of the advice that a real estate agent may be ex-
pected to offer regarding the complexities of the creatively fi-
nanced transaction is well illustrated in a recent California case,
Umet Trust v. Santa Monica Medical Inv. Co.97 Umet Trust in-
volved a real estate licensee functioning as a loan broker. Never-
theless, there is nothing in the Umet Trust court's opinion to sug-
gest that the reasoning would be any different in the context of a
sale of property. Furthermore, though the case involves a commer-
cial transaction, this should not serve as a limiting factor. If any-
thing, the real estate agent would owe a greater duty to explain
and protect from risk a noncommercial client than a commercial
client.
Umet Trust involved a loan structured in the form of a sale-
leaseback. When the borrower-tenant failed to make rent pay-
ments the lender-landlord terminated the lease and demanded
possession. In the suit that followed, the trial court completely re-
formed the transaction into an equitable mortgage. The trial court
also found that the defendant real estate firm had committed nu-
merous breaches of fiduciary duty to their client, the borrower.
The court of appeals flatly rejected the real estate firm's asser-
tion that it did not owe a fiduciary duty to the borrower:
[G]eneral principles of agency ... combine with statutory du-
ties created by the Real Estate Law ... to impose upon mort-
gage loan brokers an obligation to make a full and accurate dis-
closure of the terms of a loan to borrowers and to act always in
the utmost good faith toward their principals. 'The law imposes
on a real estate agent "the same obligation of undivided service
and loyalty that it imposes on a trustee in favor of his benefi-
ciary .... A real estate licensee is' charged with the duty of ful-
97. 140 Cal. App. 3d 864, 189 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1983).
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lest disclosure of all material facts concerning the transaction
that might affect the principal's decision. '"08
The court of appeals further explained that the trial court's find-
ings revealed overwhelmingly that the real estate firm had
breached this fiduciary duty:
[The real estate firm] failed to advise its clients that their inter-
est in the property, as lessee, could be terminated upon abbrevi-
ated notice; failed to advise its clients that the statutory right of
redemption existing in loan agreements does not exist in sale-
leaseback transactions; failed to disclose that the anti-deficiency
provisions which statutorily exist in traditional loans secured by
interests in real property do not exist in sale-leaseback transac-
tions; and failed to advise . . . that the final transaction docu-
ments contained provisions which could be interpreted as grant-
ing to [the "lender"] an immediate future interest in the
building. [The real estate firm] further affirmatively misrepre-
sented that the sale-leaseback financing gave. . . the same flexi-
bility as a conventional loan, and would accomplish the same
result. 99
The Umet Trust case opinion offers a better illustration than any
other of the character of a fair and full explanation of the nature
and risks of such an unconventional transaction.
Because of the effect of the judicial reformation on the trans-
action and California rules of law regarding damages, the borrower
was awarded only nominal damages of one dollar against the real
estate firm for its breach of the fiduciary duty. Thus, on the spe-
cific facts of this case, this real estate agent's liability turned out to
be financially insignificant. In principle, however, the case should
serve as a major warning to real estate agents. The holding and the
identified instances of misconduct illustrate that real estate agents
who are actively involved in structuring creatively financed trans-
actions owe a substantial duty to counsel their clients about un-
conventional attributes and warn them of any unusual risks.100
IV. A STATUTORY APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
The creative financing phenomenon has been associated most
98. Umet Trust, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 872-73, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 927-28 (quoting Wyatt v.
Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 782, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 397, 598 P.2d 45, 50 (1979)).
99. Umet Trust, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 873, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 927-28.
100. Also noteworthy was the court's rejection of the real estate firm's argument that
retention by its client of a separate attorney who assisted in the closing of the "loan transac-
tion" served as a superseding cause of the client's injury. Id. at 873, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 928.
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frequently with the state of California. Creative financing in large
part fueled the quadrupling of housing prices in California between
1975 and 1982. One group of researchers recently asserted that the
approximately thirty-four billion dollars of balloon payments in
California that will become due between 1983 and 1986 presents a
serious cause for public concern.1 01 It is asserted that few borrow-
ers will be able to repay the balloon payments from savings or cur-
rent income and that, if these loans cannot be refinanced, they will
go into default. The potential default crisis could be of enormous
proportions. The problem is exacerbated because many of the
seller-lenders themselves immediately purchased homes similarly
financed. They are dependent on the money owed them as credi-
tors to meet their own obligations as debtors. Thus, a small num-
ber of defaults could easily start a chain reaction. California
lawmakers are well aware of this situation and, although they have
not tackled the problem that these past transactions have raised,
they have taken definite steps to help insure that state residents
are not unwitting victims in the future.
In 1983, the California Legislature enacted the first disclosure
statute for the purpose of alerting buyers and sellers to the special
risks of certain transactions involving creative financing. 102 The
statute requires that several enumerated disclosures and warnings
be given to both buyer and seller when a purchase'0 " includes an
extension of credit by the seller. These requirements pertain to
transactions "for the purchase of a dwelling for not more than four
families in which there is an arranger of credit . "10o4 An "ar-
ranger of credit" is defined as
[a] person, other than a party to the credit transaction
.. .who is involved in developing or negotiating credit
terms, participates in the completion of the credit docu-
ments, and directly or indirectly receives compensation for
arrangement of the credit or from any transaction or
transfer of the real property which is facilitated by that
extension of credit.10 5
101. I. LOWRY, C. HILLESTAD, & S. SARMA, CALIFORNIA'S HOUSING: ADEQUACY, AVAILABIL-
ITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1983); I. LOWRY, CREATIVE FINANCING IN CALIFORNIA: THE MORNING
AFTER (1983); see also Ross, Lawsuit Foreclosures Rise as "Balloon" Notes Burst in Cali-
fornia, Wash. Post, Oct. 31, 1982, at Fl.
102. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2956-67 (West Supp. 1983).
103. "Purchase" is broadly defined to include acquisition of equitable title or a lease
with a purchase option if there is intent to transfer equitable title. Id. § 2957(d).
104. Id. § 2956.
105. Id. § 2957(a)(1).
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"Arranger of credit" does not include an attorney representing one
of the parties or a person acting as an escrow; °6 it does include a
real estate licensee or an attorney acting as a party to the
transaction. 107
Quite clearly, the typical real estate agent will serve as an "ar-
ranger of credit" in a transaction involving seller financing. Not
only will the real estate agent likely be involved in developing or
negotiating the credit terms, but the agent will also participate in
completing the credit documents that are defined to include "a
contract of sale if the contract spells out terms upon which a ven-
dor agrees to provide financing for a purchaser."'10 8
The "arranger of credit" is required to make the written dis-
closures to both the buyer and the seller. Information is to be pro-
vided to the buyer by "the arranger of credit and the vendor (with
respect to information within the knowledge of the vendor).' 0 9 In-
formation is to be provided to the seller by "the arranger of credit
and the purchaser (with respect to information within the knowl-
edge of the purchaser)."" 0 If the transaction involves "more than
one arranger of credit and one of those arrangers has obtained the
offer by the purchaser to purchase the property, that arranger shall
make the disclosure, unless the parties designate another person in
writing.""' As a result, a real estate agent will most likely bear this
burden. If only one real estate agent is involved, typically seller's
agent, then the real estate agent's obligation to the buyer would
exceed the bounds of the traditional fiduciary duty because the
seller's agent would not necessarily be a fiduciary to the buyer.
Nevertheless, in recent years courts have tended to impose certain
fiduciary-like duties upon real estate licensees with respect to buy-
ers under the rationale that buyers are members of the general
public." 2 If the transaction involves two real estate agents, as is
often the case, especially when there are strong multiple listing
services, then it would seem that the disclosure burden would fall
on the "buyer's agent" unless otherwise agreed.
Several of the statutory requirements are obviously for the
benefit of the buyer while others are for the seller. Several of the
106. Id. § 2957(a)(1) and (3).
107. Id. § 2957(a)(2).
108. Id. § 2957(c).
109. Id. § 2956(a).
110. Id. § 2956(b).
111. Id.
112. See supra note 32.
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disclosures are quite routine-for example, describing the terms of
the promissory note or providing a copy." 3 The more noteworthy
requirements are those specifically concerning the attributes of the
creatively financed transaction. Details must be provided about
senior incumbrances," 4 the credit-worthiness of the purchaser,115
and whether the purchaser is to receive any cash from the proceeds
of the transaction.1 6 Specific warnings must be given that "if refi-
nancing would be required as a result of lack of full amortization
... such refinancing might be difficult or impossible in the con-
ventional mortgage marketplace,"'1 7 and that California law "may
limit any recovery by the vendor to the net proceeds of the sale of
the security property in the event of foreclosure." 118 If negative
amortization is possible, it must be clearly disclosed and its poten-
tial effect explained." 9 Balloon payment amounts and due dates
must be disclosed with an accompanying statement "that there is
no assurance that new financing or loan extension will be available
.... "120 The act also imposes special notice requirements regard-
ing the balloon payment and mandates that all balloon notes shall
include a statement that the "note is subject to section 2966 of the
Civil Code, which provides that the holder . ..shall give written
notice to the trustor, or his successor in interest, of prescribed in-
formation at least 60 and not more than 150 days before any bal-
loon payment is due."'' With wraparound financing, a number of
disclosures must be made regarding the responsibilities for various
components of the transaction and a warning must be given that
the parties "may wish to agree to have a neutral third party desig-
nated' 1 22 to handle funds.
Finally, the act calls for a number of practical reminders or
suggestions that the parties take appropriate action regarding loss
payee clauses in property insurance policies, 123 requests for notice
of default,1 24 title insurance policies, 12 5 monitoring the payment of
113. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2963(b) (West Supp. 1983).
114. Id. § 2963(c).
115. Id. § 2963(i).
116. Id. § 2963(o).
117. Id. § 2963(d).
118. Id. § 2963(i).
119. Id. § 2963(e).
120. Id. § 2963(g).
121. Id. § 2966(d).
122. Id. § 2963(h).
123. Id. § 2963(0).
124. Id. § 2963(k).
125. Id. § 2963(1).
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property taxes, 126 and recording of security documents. 12 7
Noncompliance with these requirements does not serve to in-
validate the transaction documents. Any person, however, who
willfully violates any provision shall be liable for the actual dam-
ages that are proximately caused. The statute elaborates that a
person will not be liable if the violation is not intended and results
from "a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of proce-
dures reasonably adopted to avoid any such error." 128
Consequently, this new statute serves as clear authority in
California for finding real estate agents liable because of their fail-
ure to adequately inform buyers and sellers about the details and
risks of transactions including seller financing. The statute will
benefit the public because it serves to encourage real estate agents
to disclose several inobvious risks. It is unlikely that the typical
parties to a residential transaction will comprehend the more com-
plex disclosures, but they will probably be more inclined to seek
legal counsel. 129 Although this statute is intended to benefit the
public, it will also conceivably serve to benefit real estate agents.
To the extent that this statute establishes an exclusive claim or
remedy with respect to an agent's duty to inform about seller fi-
nancing, the statute serves to clarify greatly what an agent must do
to avoid liability. 130 Compliance with the statute should go a long
way toward establishing a defense to a claim based on an alleged
failure to adequately counsel about the details of a seller financed
transaction.'' Furthermore, the "willfullness" requirement and
126. Id. § 2963(m).
127. Id. § 2963(n).
128. Id. § 2965.
129. One commentator has critically observed:
[Dlisclosure will most likely occur after a contract of sale has already been exe-
cuted and, although the contract remains contingent on buyer's approval of the
disclosures, the momentum of the transaction at that stage may minimize the
impact of the disclosures. . . .[I]n the hands of an eager real estate agent, the
disclosure ...will be no substitute for the more dispassionate analysis of an
attorney.
Kanner, Financing Ideas-Disclosure Requirements for Creative Financing, 12 REAL EST.
L.J. 189, 194 (1983).
130. Some doubt must remain for now about the exclusivity of this claim or remedy.
Section 2964 of the California Civil Code provides that the disclosure requirements do "not
limit or abridge any obligation for disclosure created by any other provision of law or which
may exist in order to avoid fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit in the transaction." CAL. CIv.
CODE § 2964 (West Supp. 1983). Because the subject of an agent's duty to advise and inform
about creative financing has received little judicial attention thus far, California courts are
likely to be hesitant to place additional burdens upon real estate agents with respect to
advising about seller financing in light of this detailed statute.
131. The California State Realtors' Association supported passage of this new legisla-
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the "bona fide error" defense ostensibly raise serious doubts about
liability predicated on negligence. The wording, however, does
seem to contemplate liability in the event that real estate agents
fail to maintain reasonable procedures to avoid noncompliance
with the statute.
V. CONCLUSION
The high interest rates of the last several years have caused
real estate transactions to be structured in a variety of unconven-
tional forms. Real estate agents often play an active role in this
process. Although many of these transactions will probably prove
worthwhile, the comments and reports of several observers suggest
that a substantial number of these transactions are poorly con-
ceived and poorly structured. These same observers also note that
the parties are often inadequately advised. Real estate agents will
surely be blamed for failures that can be linked to the formative
stages of these transactions.
State statutes and traditional contract, agency, and tort law
rules impose a number of duties on real estate agents. These duties
may vary considerably depending on the specific facts and circum-
stances of a case. The precise nature and extent of the duty that a
real estate agent, who plays an active role in structuring a cre-
atively financed transaction, owes has received little judicial scru-
tiny thus far, and therefore will be a matter of considerable debate.
Moreover, because of the multiplicity of applicable legal theories,
the sparseness of relevant appellate decisions, and the complex and
often situation-specific character of the creatively financed trans-
action, it is not possible to definitively outline the liability produc-
ing circumstances.
It is fairly obvious, however, that the threat of liability for a
real estate agent will increase substantially when the agent plays a
role in structuring a creatively financed transaction. There is sim-
ply a greater likelihood that more will go wrong in these transac-
tions because they require more complex documentation, present
greater risks for the parties and generally require more sophisti-
cated and complete representation. For example, standard con-
tract, mortgage, or conveyance documents will typically need sig-
nificant modification or will be so unsuited to the transaction that
tion. One commentator has suggested that this support was due to the great awareness of
California realtors of their potential liability in creative financing situations. Kanner, supra
note 129, at 194.
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tailor-made documents will be necessary. Damaging flaws or weak-
nesses in documents will be fairly obvious in retrospect, and courts
will probably not be sympathetic to the real estate agent who has
performed activities bordering on or clearly constituting the unau-
thorized practice of law. Also, an explanation of the unusual attrib-
utes and risks associated with a creatively financed transaction will
be required in dealing with all but the most sophisticated par-
ties. 132 The unique California disclosure statute and the few cases
discussed in this article illustrate the considerable scope of this ex-
planation. Moreover, there is a serious fundamental question
whether a real estate agent or a lawyer should perform these func-
tions. Real estate agents are being caught in a squeeze: while there
is growing pressure for real estate agents to provide parties to a
transaction with substantial advice and counsel about legal mat-
ters, the concept of the unauthorized practice of law remains as a
counterforce. Silence on these matters would be against the best
interests of the principal and therefore improper. Thus the real es-
tate agent should supply a competent explanation or make an ap-
propriate referral. This referral should often be to a lawyer.' 3
If a referral is to be truly beneficial it should occur very early
in the transaction. 3 4 In many locales, the formation of real estate
contracts involves a two stage process. First, the parties sign a
"short form contract" that reflects an agreement with respect to
price. Typically unbeknownst to the parties, the enforceability of
these agreements is debatable because of possibly inadequate
treatment of material terms. Such a shortcoming seems likely
132. Related authority indicates that the duty of the agent varies depending on the
sophistication of the parties. See, e.g., Mallory v. Watt, 100 Idaho 119, 594 P.2d 629 (1979)
(agent's explanation must be commensurate with the education and understanding of the
principal; because client was sophisticated, agent was not liable).
133. There is apparent risk in continuing to oversee a transaction even though legal
counsel is involved when that counsel was not retained at the agent's insistence and the
agent has clearly relinquished responsibilities. See supra notes 30 & 86.
134. One commentator has recommended that real estate agents include a statement in
all contracts that "[aill parties are advised to seek legal, tax, and other counsel to consider
the implications of this agreement. Said advisors should be sought and consulted prior to
the execution of this agreement." M. LEVINE, REALTOR'S LIABILITY 136 (1979). Whether a
party's failure to seek this advice will serve to relieve the real estate agent of liability for
problems that may arise would seem to depend on the totality of circumstances. If such a
statement is to serve to protect the agent it must be conspicuous. Furthermore, the agent's
conduct must not be inconsistent. In the creatively financed transaction, extra urging may
be necessary for an agent to be able to use a defense such as election, comparative negli-
gence, or assumption of risk. Cf. Kimball Bridge Rd. v. Everest Realty Corp., 141 Ga. App.
835, 234 S.E.2d 673 (1977) (seller was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law in
failing to consult an attorney for assistance in drafting sales contract).
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when a creatively financed arrangement is briefly mentioned rather
than outlined in detail. Alternatively, if a creatively financed trans-
action is contemplated but not mentioned, a party may be bound
to a wholly unsuitable obligation if the creative financing cannot
be subsequently arranged. Lawyers often disapprove of the use of
"short form contracts" because of the uncertain status of the
transaction. Real estate agents favor the use of the "short form
contract" because it is an efficient mechanism for completing nego-
tiations with respect to the critical factor of price. The "short form
contract" contemplates the second step-entering into a "long
form contract." This occurs usually within a few days after the
parties execute the "short form contract." The "long form con-
tract" should contain all of the details of the transaction. In a real
estate transaction, especially one that is unconventional, the docu-
ment that serves to create a binding obligation should be a
blueprint for the entire transaction. In the two-step process just
described, it is often unclear precisely when a binding obligation
arises. The party's benefit is maximized only if the lawyer's repre-
sentation commences prior to the actual formation of a valid and
enforceable contract.
Because the lawyer is viewed as a potential spoiler, however,
real estate agents are often reluctant to involve lawyers in the
formative stages of a transaction. 3 5 Furthermore, because of the
135. In New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. New Jersey Ass'n of Realtor Bds., 93 N.J. 470,
484, 461 A.2d 1112, 1120 (1983) (Schreiber, J., dissenting), Justice Schreiber observed in
dissent that it is "easy to assure the lay person that an attorney is not needed and that the
seller or buyer should avoid an unnecessary cost. Indeed, the realtor will frequently arrange
for the financing, advising the purchaser that the lending institution's attorney will protect
his interest." This is a fairly widely accepted view. See also M. LEVINE, REALTOR'S LIABILITY
137 (1979) (discussing how many real estate agents have been influenced by books such, as
Robert Ringer's Winning Through Intimidation, which alerts that attorneys and others
often destroy a transaction). In Prall v. Gooden, 226 Or. 554, 360 P.2d 759 (1961), clients
testified about their real estate agent:
He explained that it was a very good deal the way he had figured it out for
us, he had taken a lot of time, had had a great deal of experience and had made
so many arrangements for people . . . that he could really see through things
where people who hadn't had that much experience couldn't . . And he told
us it was a honey of a deal for us, that we were making a huge mistake if we
didn't go ahead and sign these papers.
[W]e were rather reluctant to sign them and asked him if we couldn't show
those to an attorney-that we would like to have an attorney look them over.
And he explained that that wasn't necessary, . . . and that it would just be to
our expense to call an attorney on it, .. and that it was foolish to even go to an
attorney with the papers.
[I]n fact, these papers the ordinary attorney wouldn't understand.
Id. at 762. This conversation concerned a complicated exchange of several properties that
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routineness of many real estate transactions, the desirability of
having legal counsel has unfortunately become obscured. For ex-
ample, buyers, sellers, and real estate agents have come to place
too much significance and reliance on the coincidence of interests
between themselves and an involved institutional lender. It is often
erroneously assumed that if the lender's lawyer has no objections
then everything must be reasonably in order. A false sense of se-
curity thus develops. Because of the complexity and unconven-
tional character of the creatively financed transaction, a lawyer's
attention is all the more desirable. Ironically, because creatively fi-
nanced transactions often do not directly involve an institutional
lender, they are more likely than conventional transactions to com-
pletely escape the review of a lawyer. The growing number of ac-
tions against real estate agents concerning problems related to
complexities of creatively financed transactions may change this.
Nothing better serves to heighten awareness of responsibility than
news of the substantial liability of ones' peers. Knowledge of the
growing risk of professional liability for real estate agents should
restrain those forces that cause real estate agents to advance com-
plex transactions in the face of client ignorance or despite other
inadvisable circumstances. Real estate agents must come to accept
that if they are unable to furnish unbiased and competent advice
regarding the risks of a proposed creatively financed transaction,
or are unable to otherwise provide capable assistance in soundly
structuring the transaction, they should insist that the parties con-
sult with someone who can.
The legislatures and courts are recognizing that the role of the
real estate agent is undergoing a major change. In recent years
most states have imposed more demanding requirements for ob-
taining and maintaining real estate licenses. The increased empha-
sis on education, combined with the promotion of more complex
and varied services of real estate agents, has led the public to ex-
pect more from real estate agents than mere salesmanship. The re-
peated judicial references to professional expertise and fiduciary
duty suggests that courts often will favor naive clients over real
the agent had arranged. The clients, who had signed the agreement under a mistaken im-
pression that they would receive needed cash, eventually found out that there was no likeli-
hood of receiving any appreciable amount of cash and decided not to proceed with the
transactions. The court found that there was a breach of fiduciary duty by the agent and
stated that "[tihis reluctance to give the defendants a few hours in which to consult an
attorney indicates whose interests were uppermost in the [real estate agent's] mind when he
obtained his clients' signatures." Id.
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estate licensees. Given the increased sense of professionalism, the
expansion of services, and the heightened concern in our society
for consumer protection, one can expect the courts to hold real es-
tate agents to very high standards of loyalty, skill, and
care-standards that courts eventually may equate with those im-
posed on a lawyer or other professionals performing the same ser-
vice. Any real estate agent who structures a creatively financed
transaction without making appropriate referrals invites this
treatment.
